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Despite lofty rhetoric about development, the EU has cut




The EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) is intended to allow the EU to offer favourable trading
rules such as lower tariffs to developing countries. Gabriel Siles-Brugge writes on a recent reform
which places greater restrictions on the types of exports which are eligible for this system. He
argues that while the reform has been justified by the EU as a development policy on the grounds
that it refocuses help toward the least developed nations, rather than emerging economies such as
China and India; the real motivation is that it aids the EU’s commercial interests. In particular, by
specifically targeting the exports of emerging economies, the reform improves the leverage of the
EU in negotiations with these countries over future free trade agreements.
The EU is not only the largest provider of development aid in the world (if the contributions of all of its Member States
are included), it also imports more goods from developing countries than any other trading entity. EU leaders, such
as Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, are quick to draw on such statistics to highlight the EU’s role as ‘the
world’s key development actor’. However, a recent reform of the EU’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) –
one of the most important trade preference schemes for developing countries, providing improved access to the EU
market through lower tariffs on a range of products – suggests that it is privileging its own commercial interests over
developmental objectives.
The EU’s reform of GSP, which came into force in
January of this year, saw two major changes to the
scheme. Firstly, the EU made all high- and upper-middle
income countries ineligible for trade preferences (what
is known as ‘graduation’ in the trade policy jargon).
Secondly, it became a lot easier for a country’s more
competitive product ‘sections’ (or categories of products
collectively entitled to preferences) to be ‘graduated’ as
a result of changes to the formula by which such
graduation is undertaken. Amongst many others,
footwear from China, textiles from India and prepared
foods from Thailand now no longer enter the EU under
preferential duty rates.
The European Commission’s justification for suspending
the eligibility for GSP for what are largely emerging
economies is in keeping with its claim to be ‘the world’s
key development actor’. The Commission’s argument is
that by restricting eligibility it is ‘focus[ing] the GSP
preferences on the countries most in need’. Rather than
the increasingly competitive emerging economies, who are said to have been the prime beneficiaries of GSP so far,
it should be the so called ‘least-developed countries’ – the 49 economies judged by the United Nations to have the
lowest level of socioeconomic development – as well as other ‘vulnerable economies’ who reap the benefits of
better integration into world markets.
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There are, however, significant reasons to doubt this official line of reasoning. For one, the proposed changes are
unlikely to have much of a developmental effect for the world’s poorest. As argued in an Overseas Development
Institute paper on ‘The Poverty Impact of the Proposed Graduation Threshold in the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSP) Trade Scheme’, the reform ‘is not an effective way of helping poor, uncompetitive states’.
Ultimately, the lower tariffs offered by the GSP scheme are insufficient to offset their poor global competitiveness.
Moreover, even where the so-called ‘preference margins’ afforded by GSP (the difference between the tariffs paid by
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries) are significant for the least-developed countries, the report finds that the largest
gains from the reform will likely go to exporters from high-income countries (such as the US), who already have a
significant foothold in the EU market and are emerging economies’ primary competitors.
If the GSP reform does not clearly help its supposed beneficiaries, then what purpose does it serve? To highlight
this, Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the effect that the reform is likely to have on the top 11 users of the EU GSP scheme.
What is interesting here is that most of these countries are currently in free trade agreement negotiations with the
EU, with such economies mostly standing to lose a considerable proportion of their GSP exports to the EU (column
2). Moreover, these exports largely benefitted from a considerable ‘preference margin’, i.e. where the most-
favoured-nation (MFN) tariff – the tariff faced by those trading with the EU without any special preferences – is in
excess of five per cent (see column 3). Taken together, these statistics suggest that the GSP reform is likely to have
a significant impact on the competitiveness of these countries’ product exports to the EU.
Table 1: Likely effect of GSP reform on the top GSP exporters to the EU (potential free trade agreement
partners)
Table 2: Likely effect of GSP reform on the top GSP exporters to the EU (other GSP exporters)
Note: The tables contain the countries which account for the most exports to the EU under
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme (excluding Saudi Arabia, for which the
data was deficient). The second column shows the percentage of each country’s total exports
(to all countries, not just the EU) which would be affected by the GSP reform (average from
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2008-10, calculated from ODI estimates). The third column shows the percentage of each
country’s exports to the EU under the GSP scheme in which the so called ‘most-favoured-
nation’ (MFN) tariff (that is, the tariff they would have placed on their exports if they were not
eligible to trade under the GSP scheme) is 5 per cent or higher. In other words, these are
cases in which tariffs applied on exports to the EU are particularly high (>5 per cent) and
therefore where trading under the GSP scheme is particularly valuable. Sources: Adapted
from Siles-Brügge. Reproduced with permission.
The broader conclusion to draw from this is that the EU is specifically targeting the exports of emerging economies
in order to encourage such countries to be more forthcoming in on-going free trade negotiations. In other words, the
reform is about creating leverage with the likes of India, which the European Commission has complained about as
a difficult partner to negotiate with because it already ‘enjoys relatively good market access for goods to the EU
under the GSP’.
As the Commission somewhat disingenuously put it in its impact assessment of the regulation, while the reform
‘ha[d] nothing to do with other trade negotiations […] [it] might still have the unintended consequence of providing
more advanced developing countries with a greater incentive to enter into and conclude reciprocal trade
negotiations with the EU’ should they not wish to lose their preferential access to the European market.
What is more, the content of the reform reflects the influence of exporting business interests, which have been a key
driver of the EU’s campaign to negotiate ambitious free trade agreements with emerging economies (and more
recently the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership). Making their voices heard during a European
Commission consultation on the proposed reform back in 2010, especially their frustration at the lack of progress in
the negotiations between the EU and emerging economies, their proposals were largely mirrored in the final
regulation that was approved in 2012.
Crucially, exporters’ calls for a system that created leverage for the EU in its trade negotiations with emerging
economies won over the arguments of development NGOs. These had called on policymakers to maintain the
current system as well as consider the developmental impact of preferences.
By putting its interest in creating leverage with emerging economies before the developmental impact of the reform,
the EU appears to have privileged commercial interests over developmental considerations, lofty rhetoric
notwithstanding. Rather than promoting development goals, narrower self-interest has prevailed, suggesting that the
EU is perhaps not as uniquely ‘normative’ a power as it often claims to be.
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